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1Bank Supervision Russian style: Rules versus Enforcement and Tacit
Objectives
Abstract
We focus on the conﬂict between two central bank objectives, namely individual bank stabil-
ity and systemic stability. We study the licensing policy of the Central Bank of Russia (CBR) in
1999-2002. Banks in poorly banked regions, banks that are too big to be disciplined adequately
and banks that are active on the interbank market enjoy protection from license withdrawal,
showing a tacit concern for systemic stability. The CBR is also reluctant to withdraw licenses
from banks that violate the individuals’ deposits to capital ratio, because this conﬂicts with the
tacit CBR objective to secure depositor trust and systemic stability.
Keywords: Bank supervision, bank crisis, Russia.
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21I n t r o d u c t i o n
Economic research has given a lot of attention to the individual tasks of central banks, such as
monetary policy, lender of last resort services, bank supervision, maintaining payments system sta-
bility and ﬁnancial stability. The complementarities and conﬂicts between these functions have also
received academic attention. There exists, for example, a potential conﬂict between monetary pol-
icy and systemic stability. A too narrow price stability objective may, through an accommodating
monetary policy, induce a lending boom and asset price inﬂation. This increases the risk of systemic
instability, as was the case in the Nordic bank crises of the early nineties. Kaminsky and Reinhart’s
(1999) ﬁnding that crises are often preceded by relaxed monetary policy, asset price bubbles and
lending booms suggests that there is a trade-oﬀ between monetary policy and systemic stability.
They also found that most crises were preceded by ﬁnancial liberalization, probably because the
ﬁnancial liberalization was incomplete or not followed by appropriate regulation and supervision in
the newly liberated ﬁnancial sectors. This suggests another trade-oﬀ, namely one between systemic
stability and individual bank supervision. In their seminal paper, Peek, Rosengren and Tootell
(1999) found that the implementation of monetary policy can beneﬁt from information obtained
by prudential supervision and control of the banking system. This has heated the debate whether
bank supervision should be assigned to the central bank or not (Di Noia and Di Giorgio, 1999).
T h ep o s s i b l ec o n ﬂicts arising from the coexistence of a lender of last resort and deposit insurance
has also received academic interest (see e.g. Sleet and Smith, 2000; Repullo, 2000).
In this paper we devote attention to the conﬂict between systemic stability and individual bank
stability, both explicit objectives of many a central bank. To assure systemic stability central banks
typically take on the role of lender of last resort. This comes at the cost of moral hazard by individ-
ual banks. This conﬂict can be solved by prudential regulation and control (see Dewatripont and
Tirole, 1994), which in several countries is in the hands of the central bank too. Bank supervision
is meant to give individual banks an incentive to take less risk, in this way alleviating the moral
hazard of individual banks that follows from the presence of a lender of last resort. The strict
enforcement of bank regulation may however endanger systemic stability and draw the regulator to
a policy of regulatory forbearance, which again creates moral hazard. In short individual and sys-
temic bank stability may be conﬂicting objectives and therefore rule-based supervision of individual
banks may be inconsistent with the objective of systemic stability. This could for example occur if
the regulatory failure of a money centre bank or a large deposit bank threatens to aﬀect trust in
3the interbank market or the deposit market respectively, giving rise to contagion and inﬂating the
risk of systemic instability. This inherent conﬂict is even present in central banks that have neither
systemic nor individual bank stability as explicit objectives, since any central bank needs a stable
banking system in order to be able to conduct an eﬀective monetary policy.
T h ee c o n o m i cl i t e r a t u r eh a sb e e na w a r eo ft h ec o n ﬂict and there is no conclusive theory that
explains how bank supervision and lender of last resort functions should be balanced. The good old
Bagehot rule of 1873 -"lend freely to illiquid but solvent banks at a penalty rate"- is still defended
by many authors. Goodhart (1988, 1995) puts forward that liquidity should not be denied to any
bank a priori, since the diﬀerence between illiquidity and insolvency is sometimes hard to tell.
Goodhart and Huang (1999) propose that the central bank reduces moral hazard of individual
banks by employing a policy of constructive ambiguity in the bailout decision to reduce moral
hazard. Other authors do not agree with this harsh policy and claim that softer policies will induce
truthful reporting of asset quality and will in the end lead to cheaper bank rescues and higher
systemic stability (see Povel, 1996; Aghion et al, 1999). Cordella and Yeyati (2003) claim that
an ex ante central bank commitment to a bailout contingent on adverse macro-shocks is welfare
superior to the policy of constructive ambiguity. Freixas, Parigi and Rochet (2000) show that, if
all banks are solvent, it is optimal for the central bank to prevent a speculative gridlock in the
payments system by guaranteeing the credit lines of all banks. Individual bank insolvency however
should be solved by orderly bank closure whereby the central bank bypasses the insolvent bank in
the interbank network to avoid contagion. They also show that it may be optimal for the central
bank to show forbearance towards money centre banks, which is their interpretation of the too big
to fail hypothesis (see Wall and Peterson, 1990).
Central banks also have several less straightforward incentives for regulatory forbearance. Boot
and Thakor (1993) show that regulatory discretion urges reputation-seeking regulators to show
more forbearance than optimal, because they are inclined to avoid failures on their book in order to
leave the job with a clean slate. This suggests that a rule-based prudential control would be better.
Mailath and Mester (1994) on the other hand show that if regulators cannot commit themselves,
temporary forbearance may be the equilibrium outcome. In the same line, Acharya (1996) ﬁnds
that regulatory forbearance may be optimal if the dead-weight losses of closure are important. Kane
(2000) indicates that some banks may simply be too big to discipline adequately (TBTDA), which
can lead to undesired de facto forbearance. Heinemann and Schüler (forthcoming) analyze how
there may be a problem of regulatory capture (see Laﬀont and Tirole, 1991 for more on this) by
4speciﬁc interest groups. As a consequence one cannot be certain that the enforcement of prudential
rules would be optimal for welfare even in the case of unthreatened systemic stability.
In short there is no consensus in the literature how to strike the right balance between individual
and systemic bank stability if the central bank performs both prudential control and lender of last
resort functions1. We look at this question from an empirical angle by analyzing one of the most
intriguing cases of central banking in recent history, namely Russia. The Central Bank of Russia
(CBR) is a very young central bank. From the onset in 1990 it was entrusted with monetary policy,
bank regulation and bank supervision. It also plays a central role in the money circulation and the
payments system and has at many occasions secured systemic stability by acting as a lender of last
resort. In our data window, it was still active as a commercial bank through its giant daughters,
Sberbank and Vneshtorgbank. Hence the objectives are manifold and so are the potential conﬂicts
between them.
Speciﬁcally, we look at the CBR’s supervision of Russian commercial banks. The CBR both
designs the rules, within the framework of the banking law, and has the single authority to enforce
them. Hence no conﬂict between competing regulatory agents should be expected. In April 1996,
the CBR announced a set of new and revised prudential regulations to which banks need to comply
to maintain their bank license. By setting bank standards the CBR intends to create incentives for
banks to take less risk2. These bank standards will however only induce the desired eﬀect on bank
risk-taking if banks anticipate that the standards will be enforced. Proper enforcement involves
license withdrawal as the ultimate penalty for banks in repeated violation. We refer to this as the
regulatory failure of a bank. Regulatory forbearance by the CBR would impair the credibility of
its own bank standards, resulting in soft legal constraints (see Perotti 2002).
The empirical question in this paper is whether the CBR’s delicensing is driven by the en-
forcement of its own supervisory bank standards, or rather by other more tacit objectives that are
related to the systemic stability of the banking system which may induce regulatory forbearance.
We employ a quarterly panel of Russian banks in the period 1999-2002 and relate license with-
drawal or the lack thereof to standard economic variables (i.e. we control for economic failure), to
tacit objectives by the CBR in the large domain of systemic stability, and to compliance with bank
standards. Controlling for economic failure, we cannot reject the thesis that tacit CBR objectives
1In developed economies bank supervision tends to fall more and more in the realm of a singly authority without
central bank involvement, although it is not impossible that this trend will be reversed in the long run.
2Although Blum (1999) shows theoretically that the eﬀect of capital rules on bank risk taking is ambiguous.
5skew the license withdrawal decision. We also ﬁnd regulatory forbearance for some bank standards.
More speciﬁcally our results indicate regulatory forbearance by the CBR for large deposit banks
(safeguarding depositor trust), banks that are active on the interbank market (safeguarding inter-
bank market stability) and banks in already very concentrated regional bank markets (safeguarding
minimal bank competition). Hence the CBR cares about systemic stability and this implies con-
ﬂicts with rule-based bank supervision. We also ﬁnd indications that the CBR leaves the banks
that are too big to be disciplined alone, and weak evidence that banks that hold a large share of
total government debt tend to be less likely to be subjected to license withdrawal. In short we
ﬁnd that the biases in the CBR’s licensing behavior are best understood as the result of conﬂicting
objectives at the heart of the CBR, rather than as a case of pure regulatory discretion3.
The next section describes the Russian banking sector in a nutshell and overviews the process
of bank creation and bank destruction in Russia during the last 15 years. Section 3 explains our
empirical approach, focusing consecutively on the data and the empirical hypotheses. In section
4 we estimate a panel logit model and interpret the results. In section 5 we perform a robustness
check by estimating a survival model and reviewing the results. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Russian banking sector in a nutshell
2.1 Problems of the Russian banking sector
The Russian commercial banking sector has been plagued by a number of serious problems in the
ﬁrst decade of its existence.
Russian commercial banks have not adequately taken up the role of intermediary between
savings and investments. In early transition banks clearly preferred speculation to lending (Schoors,
2001). Lending to the economy as a percentage of total banking assets sank year after year until
1999 and has not spectacularly improved since. In 2003 bank assets had grown only up to 42.1
per cent of GDP and loans to the non-ﬁnancial sector were still restricted to just 17.0 per cent.
Bank credits ﬁnanced as little as 4.8 per cent of ﬁxed investment in 20034. With hindsight this
behavior was not irrational. The presence of soft legal constraints made it very hard for banks to
enforce overdue claims. Bank lending was also depressed by very large information asymmetries
3Malyutina and Parilova (2001) argue that the CBR based its closure policy on discretion rather than on its
prudential regulations, but we argue that there are other ’tacit’ objectives at stake.
4Data from the CBR Bulletin of Bank Statistics.
6between banks and their prospective customers, and by the lack of screening and monitoring skills
in the banks themselves and in the economy at large. Banks were not able to discriminate between
potential borrowers (Brana, Maurel and Sgard, 1999) and preferred not to lend at all. Moreover,
the vast amount of very small banks and the lack of a transparent information system about their
credit histories may have contributed to less lending (Pyle, 2001).
In addition the little lending that took place was mainly to the government (under various
forms), as witnessed in the August 1998 crisis when several large banks became illiquid and insol-
vent overnight when the government defaulted on its treasury bills, or to connected parties. The
widespread connected lending is partly explained by historical factors. The successors of the for-
mer specialized state banks were reluctant to restructure and continued to lend passively to their
owners (Schoors, 2003). Many of the newly founded private banks have been captured by dominant
shareholders. These so-called ’pocket banks’ operate as the treasury of a ﬁrm or a group of ﬁrms
rather than as an independent bank and they prefer ’putting their money where their mouth is’
to normal relationship lending. This makes the problem of connected lending or insider lending
omnipresent in Russia. Most banks predominantly lend to connected agents, regardless of the via-
bility of the lending project, with only very weak monitoring incentives (Laeven, 2001). Note that
the government too is to some extent a connected party, because several banks are captured by
local, regional or national governments. At the start of 2003, Russia had 23 banks in which the
state (federal or regional authorities) held majority stakes, the regional authorities hold minority
stakes in many more banks and a large number of state unitary enterprises were part-owners of
banks (Tompson, 2004).
The problem of connected lending combined with the presence of soft legal constraints, informa-
tion asymmetries and the lack of screening and monitoring skills implied that the Russian banking
sector was riddled by bad loans well before the 1998 crisis. A leaked analysis of Russian banks after
the crisis of August 1998 shows that the major loss of capital for banks was not the devaluation
loss or the government default on treasury bills (the famous GKO), but bad loans that had been
left to perish in their balances already for some time5. The banks had been hiding these bad loans.
Schoors and Sonin (2005) explain that the Russian banking system was stuck in a passivity trap,
where it was rational for all banks to hide bad loans rather than to enforce them. The real growth
that took place since 1999 has allowed the Russian banks to ’grow’ their way out of bad loans, but
we should keep in mind that loan quality is in the end a ﬂow rather than a stock variable. It will
5See The newly-wed and the nearly dead, Euromoney, June 1999.
7not go away unless the nature of the ﬂow changes.
The Russian banking sector also suﬀered from poor capitalization when compared to liquid
assets (deposits and interbank loans), especially considering the poor quality of assets and the large
exposure to exchange rate risk6. This overexposure was revealed when the devaluation in August
1998 sent many Russian banks from positive to negative capital overnight (Perotti, 2002). The CBR
has steadily raised capital standards since 1999, but bank capitalization is still substantially lower
in Russia than in developed banking markets. Our data also reveal that average capitalization is
substantially higher than the weighted average capitalization, indicating that precisely the largest
banks have the weakest capitalization, not exactly a comforting result. The diﬀerence is most
pronounced when total bank deposits are used as weights, implying that the buﬀer of capital is
lowest in the banks that need it most.
Many banks were liquidated or simply vanished. Sometimes this was due to a combination of
the above factors (poor capitalization, too much speculative risk, endemic bad loans, connected
lending etc.), but there were also a large number of ﬁnancial scandals and scams, where depositors
w e r es i m p l yc h e a t e db yc r o o k st h a tﬂed with their money. The very soft legal constraints faced by
banks encouraged asset stripping by the management and the owners, leaving the creditors to bear
the brunt of the cost of failure (Perotti, 2002). As a result, popular distrust of the banking system
became rampant and depositors gradually shifted their money to Sberbank and Vnestorgbank,
the former state banks that are still in the state’s hands (see OECD, 2004). Sberbank has a
huge branch network and carries a government guarantee. The government lent credibility to this
guarantee by supporting Sberbank if needed and using it as a device to absorb deposits from large
defunct deposit banks in the aftermath of the 1998 crisis. The same holds for Vneshtorgbank, as
demonstrated in the mini-crisis in May-July 2004 when Vneshtorgbank ﬁnally acquired Gutabank,
one of the larger deposit banks under attack. As a result Sberbank and Vneshtorgbank dominate
a very concentrated deposit market. Figure 1 shows Herﬁndahl indices for deposits in several
federal districts and reveals that deposit markets were highly concentrated in the period 1999-2002,
although regional diﬀerences were substantial.
Note also that there was no true national banking market, be it in commercial lending, deposits,
interbank lending or even foreign exchange trading. Only very few banks had nation-wide branch
networks and banks distrust each other. After the 1998 crisis, the only remaining banks with
a national scope were Sberbank and arguably Vneshtorgbank, then still both daughters of the
6See, for example, Buch and Heinrich (1999).
8CBR7. Regional disparities in the Russian banking sector are huge. In the period under study,
some regions still enjoy an acceptable amount of competition, while other regions exhibit very high
concentration. This can be seen from the regional data on bank branches per capita in ﬁgure
2. Regions have on average only 2 bank branches per 100000 inhabitants, which is very little to
European standards. The large regional diﬀerences in concentration are demonstrated in ﬁgure 3,
that exhibits regional Herﬁndahl indexes for bank assets. The absence of a national market can
also be seen directly from the substantial diﬀerences in regional interest rates and even exchange
rates8, that can only be sustained by fragmented markets. Note that the deposit market (ﬁgure 1)
is even more concentrated than the banking sector as a whole (ﬁgure 3).
Insert ﬁgures 1 to 3 here
It is clear that by 1998 bank restructuring had been long in the waiting. Several observers
and notably the IMF repeatedly expressed hope that the 1998 crisis would ﬁnally urge the CBR
to undertake serious bank restructuring. In the immediate aftermath of the crisis, the CBR itself
indicated that it expected 400 to 600 banks to disappear. These expectations were dashed soon
enough, mainly because the banks themselves faced very soft legal constraints. Consequently many
of the banking system characteristics remained fundamentally unchanged.
2.2 An overview of bank creation and bank destruction in Russia
Since we study bank licensing behavior of the CBR, an introductory description of the big trends
in CBR bank licensing is required.
Insert ﬁgure 4 here
Figure 4 shows the detailed dynamics of monthly bank creation and destruction in Russia. It
is based on data that are freely available on the CBR-website. The solid line shows new bank reg-
istrations, while the dotted line shows bank licenses withdrawn in a given month. We ﬁrst turn to
bank creation. There is a striking peak of bank creation at the end of 1990: 228 banks were created
in October 1990, 347 in November 1990 and 269 in December 1990. This peak is to a large extent
explained by the secessionist privatization of the former state banks (spetsbanki) that started in
1988 - well before the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991 - and continued initially unat-
tended. This secessionist privatization yielded over 600 often unrecognizable state-bank successors
7Note that in 2004 ownership of Vneshtorgbank moved from the CBR to the state directly.
8These numbers can be found in the CBR publication Bulletin of Bank Statistics, available in English on the CBR
website.
9as explained in detail by Schoors (2003). At the same time, individuals, governments, corporations
and other organizations created a number of new banks. Bank creation by economic agents other
than former state banks took oﬀ spectacularly in 1992-1994. Many of these new banks were however
casinos rather than banks or, worse, smartly clad crooks (the MMM pyramid of Sergey Mavrodi
being the obvious example). This was partly due to the very relaxed bank supervision by Viktor
Gerashenko, the former president of Gosbank and the president of the CBR since the summer of
1992, when the hard-nosed but unexperienced CBR president Matyukhin was outmaneuvered by
the industrial lobby. The bank creation numbers suggest that bank supervision was tightened from
1995 on, under the reign of Tatiana Paramonova. The process of bank creation dropped sharply
and remained very low from 1996 onwards. This was due to the introduction and enforcement of
stricter minimum capital requirements in April 1996 under the reign of the Sergey Dubinin at the
helm of the CBR. Only in 2001 the rate of bank creation picked up to a meaningful level again.
Bank destruction follows a diﬀerent pattern altogether. There is a peak of license withdrawals
in the ﬁrst half of 1992 when the CBR was headed by the new and hard-nosed reformer Matyukhin.
Under political pressure, he was replaced in mid 1992 with Gerashenko, the last president of the
defunct Gosbank, the former state monobank that ceased to exist together with the Soviet Union
by end December 1991. Immediately the number of license withdrawals dropped to substantially
lower levels. Indeed from mid-1992 until end 1994, the CBR had a very relaxed policy towards bank
licensing and bank reﬁnancing and banks were awash with liquidity (Schoors, 2001). This left Russia
with well above 2000 banks by end 1994. The exchange rate crisis in October 1994 cost Gerashenko
his position as president and he was replaced with the more reform-minded Paramonova. She made
a ﬁrst sweep of the banking sector in early 1995, to clean up the mess of the exchange rate crisis.
A second wave of license withdrawals peaked in November 1995 in the aftermath of the meltdown
on the Russian interbank money market in August 1995. Apparently the CBR reacted to crises by
enforcing some of its regulations ex post, a pattern of behavior it has continued ever since. Once the
new chairman of the CBR, Dubinin, came into power he swept through the licenses in May 1996,
after the introduction of new minimal capital requirements, and repeated this exercise in March
1997. Still the majority of banks that lost their license under Paramonova and Dubinin were very
small banks without political clout. In several cases the bank was already bankrupt, or even worse,
had been looted by its directors. In this sense the CBR was, even in the apparent good times of
1995-1997, following events rather than anticipating them.
With the crisis of August 1998 Dubinin had to go and Gerashenko emerged again at the helm of the
10CBR to sort out the mess. He achieved the stabilization of the banking system and sorted out the
clogged payments system by bailing out the banks without enforcing a change in their behavior.
Oﬃcially there was an ”Agency for the Restructuring of Credit Organizations” (ARCO)9, but it
was underfunded and did not achieve much in the way of bank restructuring. Figure 4 indicates
that the pace of license withdrawal did not pick up but fell instead to very low levels. This
was not only due to Gerashenko’s weak policy but also resulted from a striking but well hidden
deﬁciency in Russian law, namely the exemption of banks from the bankruptcy code, a dreary
detail of which many foreign creditors were not fully aware. This ensured that creditors could
not easily enforce their claims on banks. The banking sector had insisted on this exemption and
was thereafter successful in blocking all draft laws on bankruptcy of banks until a law ’on the
restructuring of credit organization’ ﬁnally came into force in March 1999. This legal loophole
gave less benevolent banks the opportunity to loot creditors by stripping banks from their valuable
assets and transferring them to so-called bridge banks. This procedure was practiced on a grand
scale in the aftermath of the 1998 crisis. Insolvent institutions transferred their valuable assets
to bridge banks, while leaving the liabilities in the defaulting or troubled institutions. Foreign
creditors were furious and when the March 1999 law came into power, the IMF strongly pressed
the CBR to perform at least some restructuring. As a consequence some high proﬁle banks lost
their license, among which Promstroibank and Mosbusinessbank, two direct successors of the former
specialized state banks. These bankruptcies were however more symbolic then real. Their smooth
death had become convenient to all parties, the creditors excluded. This again had much to do
with the stipulations of the new law and the choices of the CBR. The March 1999 law provides
that creditors can only take a bank to bankruptcy after the CBR has withdrawn the license. In
practice the CBR often waited too long to withdraw the license, in this way delaying bankruptcy
proceedings and allowing the looting to take place. All too often licenses were only withdrawn
when the bankruptcy of the empty and illiquid shell had become convenient to all parties, with the
notable exception of creditors. This pattern of convenient bankruptcy was typical of the process of
’mired restructuring’ that took place after 1998 (Schoors, 1999).
9See Mizobata (2002) and Tompson (2002) for more on this topic.
113 Empirical approach
We analyze the licensing behavior of the CBR in the period 1999-2002. This period is chosen
because of four reasons. First, most of the casinos, exchange oﬃces, extremely small banks and
smartly clad crooks had already disappeared from the system by virtue of the successive sweeps
through the bank licenses in the period 1995-1997 (see previous section). Most of the banks in the
sample therefore perform at least some of the standard bank functions. Second, we want a period
with a consistent regulatory policy, since the various CBR presidents in the past have shown widely
diﬀerent supervisory preferences. In 1999-2002 bank licensing behavior is - again - in the hands
of Viktor Gerashenko, who emerged at the head of the CBR after the 1998 crisis. Third, in 1998
the CBR introduced a new accounting system that moves away from Russian accounting standards
(RAS) in the direction of international accounting standards (IAS). This renders it much more
diﬃcult, though not impossible, to compare bank data before and after the crisis, unless a major
conversion eﬀort is undertaken. Last, the new law on bank restructuring that came into eﬀect in
March 1999 gave the CBR a central role in bank restructuring, which was expected to strongly
aﬀect the CBR’s licensing behavior.
We use data from three sources, namely Interfaks, Mobile and the CBR. We describe the data
in detail in appendix A. In section 4 we estimate a panel logit model, where the dependent variable
will be a dummy variable equal to 1 for every bank quarter that sees a license withdrawal and 0
otherwise. In section 5 we turn to bank license survival as a dependent variable and perform a
survival analysis. We will relate license withdrawals and bank survival to three groups of variables,
namely 1) compliance to regulatory standards, 2) variables that capture the tacit objectives of
the central bank, and 3) economic (bank- and market-speciﬁc) variables, predicted by economic
theory. In the rest of this section we list all variables, explain why we use them and how exactly
we calculate them.
3.1 Compliance with regulatory standards
For each prudential bank standard in each quarter, the dataset tells us how the bank scores. From
the legislation and from CBR documents we know how banks are supposed to score on each bank
standard in each quarter (see appendices A and B for a detailed description). If the score does
n o ts a t i s f yt h es t a n d a r d ,w eh a v eab r e a c ho ft h es t a n d a r d .W eu s et h i si n f o r m a t i o no nb r e a c h e s
to construct measures of individual bank compliance to the CBR’s regulatory standards. We start
12observing bank-speciﬁcs c o r e so nb a n ks t a n d a r d sa tt i m etPR
0
10.
We construct several vectors of variables that are assumed to measure compliance with CBR
standards. For each bank standard, we have the bank-speciﬁc scores on a quarterly basis. Based
on the deﬁnition for each bank standard n and its regulatory minimum or maximum imposed by
t h eC B R ,w ed e ﬁne standard -speciﬁc breaches and count these breaches per bank and per bank
standard. However, counting the number of breaches is cumbersome for two reasons. First we want
the number of breaches to be time-varying, but this implies that the total number of breaches will
be higher for later quarters. We get round this problem by a simple correction. Secondly, some
banks are created after tPR
0 , which means that they will have less bankquarters in the sample and
ceteris paribus will register less breaches. This also calls for a correction. Therefore we correct the
simple sum of breaches for bank i until t by dividing it by the maximal number of possible breaches
at time t and multiplying it by the number of breaches that is maximally possible for banks created
before tPR
0 and still alive in t. More speciﬁcally, we deﬁne for each regulation n and for each bank
i, the number of past breaches at time t:
nbreachn,i,t =
Pt
z=k breachz
t − k
(t − tPR
0 ),
with breach equal to one when a bank violates the rule and zero otherwise, k the start of observations
for the bank i and t the observed bank quarter for bank i. Figure 5 illustrates what this implies
for banks with diﬀerent dates of entry.
Insert ﬁgure 5 here
A second measure takes into account that the CBR possibly attaches more importance to current
breaches than to past breaches. Put simply, a bank which violated twice during the previous two
quarters has the same score on nbreach at time t as a bank with only two breaches last year, while
one might expect the CBR at time t to attach more value to the former than to the latter. We
construct a second vector of compliance variables that discount past breaches.
Deﬁne the weights:
 t = α(1 − α)t, with
∞ X
t=0
 t =1 .
10For most bank standards, this is in 1997:Q2. For N10.1 this is in 1997:Q3 and for N9.1 this is in 1998:Q1, because
these standards were introduced later. The data between 1997:Q2 and 1999:Q1 on scores of banks on prudential bank
standards are from Mobile. For 1999:Q2 -2002:Q4 the scores on bank standards are from Interfaks. See appendix A
for a detailed description of the diﬀerent datasources available for Russian banking and their compatibility.
13Then the discounted number of breaches for each regulation n and a given bank i at time t is:
dnbreachn,i,t =
Pt
z=k  t(breachz)
t − k
(t − tPR
0 ).
In order to compare the coeﬃcients of the two variables in the regressions, they should have the
same measure. However the sum of the weights used to calculate dnbreach equals unity, while
implicitly the sum of the weights used to calculate nbreach equals t − k.T h e r e f o r ew ea d j u s tt h e
measure for dnbreach by multiplying again with t − k,w h i c hg i v e s :
dnbreachn,i,t =
t X
z=k
 t(breachz)(t − tPR
0 ).
The CBR may also care for the average severity of breach, rather than the number of breaches. We
therefore construct a third variable for each norm n to capture this notion:
sbreachn,i,t =
Pt
z=k
³
|scorez−standardz|
standardz
´
t − k
.
Obviously we calculate this as a one-sided variable. Speciﬁcally the deviation of the score from the
standard is only counted in the case of a breach and equal to zero otherwise. We take absolute
values to ensure that a breach is always deﬁned as a positive number. Again, one can assume that
the CBR cares more about the severity of current breaches than about the severity of past breaches.
The discounted severity of breach is then deﬁned as:
dsbreachn,i,t =
Pt
z=k  t
³
|scorez−standardz|
standardz
´
t − k
,
To ensure comparability of the coeﬃcients, we need again multiply with t − k,w h i c hg i v e s :
dsbreachn,i,t =
t X
z=k
 t
µ
|scorez − standardz|
standardz
¶
.
Possibly the CBR cares about the total volume of breaches, rather then the number of breaches or
their average severity. We therefore construct a variable that captures the total volume of breaches.
This should be interpreted as the one-sided total distance over time for a given bank between any
bank standard n and the bank’s actual score on the standard:
vbreachn,i,t = nbreachn,i,t ∗ sbreachn,i,t
14There is a last twist in the measurement of compliance variables. For some banks in some quarters,
the scores on bank standards are missing. Apparently some banks sometimes fail to report their
score to the CBR. These non-reported bank scores can be interpreted as compliance, as non-
compliance or as something in between by the CBR. Rather than making assumptions about this
in the calculation of the compliance variables, we will introduce a dummy variable for non-reported
bank scores in a given bank quarter as a separate variable in the regressions, allowing the data
to decide how the CBR interprets missing values. We will in fact ﬁnd that banks which often fail
to report are much more likely to loose their licence and are less likely to survive. This indicates
that the CBR interpretsnon-reported scores as a very bad signal of underlying bank health or
alternatively that banks that expect to loose their license anyhow do not even bother to submit
their scores on the bank standards any longer.
3.2 Tacit objectives of the CBR
Regional banking coverage The CBR feared that in some regions banking became too con-
centrated. ARCO has indicated it supported some banks with regional networks to avoid that
some regions would become underbanked (Mizobata (2002) and Tompson (2002)). We therefore
expect that banks in already very concentrated regional banking markets are less likely to lose their
license, as compared to identical banks in less concentrated regions. As a concentration measure,
we use the regional Herﬁndahl index, calculated as the sum of squared regional market shares for
each region j and quarter t:
nj X
i=1
h
(MSijt)
2
i
.
The regional banking coverage is very stable in our data window, with some very poor and some
very well banked regions. The very low variability of this variable in our sample implies that it
is not ﬁt to explain quarter-speciﬁc variance in the bank licence withdrawal behavior of the CBR.
Therefore, in the estimations we will employ the average of this variable over time such that we
have one observation per region.
Systemic stability The CBR cares about systemic stability which is likely to lead to biases in
its (de-)licensing behavior. We will look at the following variables:
• The CBR may wish to protect banks that are active on the interbank market to minimize
15the risk of contagion. As a proxy for banks that are active on the interbank market, we use
the ratio of interbank liabilities IL to total liabilities TL.
• The CBR may wish to speciﬁcally protect money centre banks to enhance the stability of
the interbank market. If some large banks at the heart of the interbank system fail, the
whole banking system could collapse11. The CBR will want to avoid this out of motivations
of systemic stability12. This cannot be captured by the relative importance of interbank
liabilities IL in bank-speciﬁc liabilities. Since all important banks are active on the Moscow
interbank market, we include the interbank market share MSILin total interbank liabilities:
MSIit =
ILit
n X
i=1
ILit
• The CBR may wish to protect large deposit banks to avoid deposit runs13 and restore trust
in the banking sector. Interestingly, this can be measured by the regulatory bank standard
N11 (household deposits over capital). We expect therefore to see forbearance of breaches
of N11, since enforcement of this standard is not consistent with other CBR objectives (see
appendix B for a more detailed description of this bank standard).
Political inﬂuence
• We include the ratio of government claims G to total assets TA to measure government
capture. Banks that lend relatively more to the government may have more political clout
and receive protection against de-licensing. When banks have a lot of government bonds
in their portfolio, the CBR might prefer not to close the bank when it has an interest in
distributing these bonds. This was actually the case for GKOs prior to 1998 (Malyutina and
Parilova, 2001).
• Possibly, we need to look at the portfolio of the Ministry of Finance, rather than the individual
bank portfolio. Speciﬁcally, the CBR may mainly be captured by banks that hold a large
11See, for example, Wall and Peterson (1990) on the FDIC bailout of Continental Illinois and Kapstein (1994) and
Davis (1992) on the failure of Herstatt Bank.
12Freixas et al. (2000) show that it may be too costly to close down money centre banks because it might trigger
the liquidation of all other banks. See also Rochet and Tirole (1996) on this point.
13Models of a bank runs include Diamond and Dybvig (1983), Postlewaite and Vives (1987), Wallace (1990), Chari
(1989), Champ, Smith and Williamson (1996), Alonso (1996).
16absolute amount of government claims G (mainly bonds). Indeed the government may be
less than willing to liquidate its largest ﬁnanciers, while smaller banks are less important.
Therefore we include the government portfolio market share MSGin total government claims:
MSGit =
Git
n X
i=1
Git
• The CBR may be less willing to sort out pocket-banks. These banks are often dominated
by very powerful but closed groups with a lot of political clout, tend to be isolated from the
rest of the banking sector and hardly take any household deposits. Therefore the CBR has
few incentives, from the point of view of systemic stability, to enforce bank standards N9.1
and N10.1 and strong political incentives to show forbearance for breaches of bank standards
N9.1 and N10.1 (see appendix B for a more detailed description of these bank standards).
Too big to be disciplined adequately Some banks may be simply too big to fail. This can be
justiﬁed on the grounds that the collapse of a large bank poses a threat to the banking system as
a whole (see Wall and Peterson, 1990). This is already measured in our analysis by the interbank
market share that identiﬁes money centre banks. There is also evidence that the CBR gave a lot
of credit to the largest banks (Malyutina and Parilova (2001)), which in turn lowered its incentives
to close down these banks as the cost of closure increased, but we do not unfortunately have this
information. Kane (2000) indicates that some banks may simply be too big to discipline adequately
(TBTDA), rather than too big to fail, which creates a problem of undesired de facto forbearance
even in developed market economies like the US. This may certainly be a problem in Russia, where
the understaﬀed and relatively young department of bank supervision is not up to the task of
controlling really large banks with their complex activities and intricate balances. We measure the
TBTDA-bias in licensing behavior by including bank size (the log of total assets), which should be
positively (negatively) related to survival (license withdrawal) probability.
3.3 Economic variables
We include a set of bank- and market-speciﬁc variables which are expected to inﬂuence license
withdrawal, next to (non-)compliance with prudential regulation and variables related to tacit
CBR objectives:
17• A high return-to-assets ratio ROA should reduce (increase) license withdrawal probability
(survival).
• The cost-to-assets ratio is expected to be positively (negatively) correlated with license
withdrawal (survival).
• The ratio of interbank liabilities to total liabilities IL/TL is an indicator of the liquidity of
liabilities and should be positively (negatively) correlated with license withdrawal (survival)
(Calomiris and Mason, 2000).
• The regional market share in assets is a proxy for market power. In the structure-conduct-
performance framework the eﬀect of market power on license withdrawal (survival) is expected
to be negative (positive).
MSAijt =
TAijt
n X
i=1
TAijt
• Poor loan quality as measured by the ratio of non-performing loans NPL to total loans TL
should increase (reduce) the license withdrawal probability (survival).
• The ratio of total reserves (including excess reserves) TRto total assets TA, as an indicator
of absolutely safe liquidity, should reduce (increase) license withdrawal probability (survival).
3.4 Contradictory hypotheses
There are some clear contradictions in the above hypotheses:
1. Either the CBR enforces N11 or it protects large and weakly capitalized deposit banks, which
implies forbearance.
2. Either the CBR enforces N9.1 and N10.1, or it prefers to leave pocket banks alone, which
implies forbearance.
3. Large holdings of government bonds either protects banks against de-licensing because of gov-
ernment capture or accelerates bank demise because of the government’s default on treasury
bills in August 1998 and the subsequent liquidity problems in the banks concerned.
184. Either the CBR protects banks that are active on the interbank market (high IL/TL)o r
these highly liquid liabilities make banks more vulnerable and therefore more likely to fail as
suggested by Calomiris and Mason (2000).
Table 1 summarizes the deﬁnitions and sources of all the variables described above.
insert table 1 around here
3.5 Summary statistics and correlations
Summary statistics for all variables are given in table 2. Note that we excluded Sberbank, Vnesh-
torgbank and Vnesheconombank from the sample. They are totally dominated by the CBR and
their survival is ensured in any case. This still leaves us with more than 20000 bank quarters of
data available for estimations. Table 2a shows summary statistics for the economic variables and
the variables that measure tacit CBR objectives. The Moscow control variable reveals that 48% of
bank quarters are from banks registered in the Moscow region. All other variables show reasonable
average values. The ratios are never below zero and never above 100%, although some bankquarters
actually reach the maximum of 100%. The regional Herﬁndahl index indicates that there is quite
some variation in bank concentration across regions.
The summary statistics of regulatory compliance variables in table 2b reveal that the maximum
number of breaches is for some bank standards disconcertingly close to 23, the number of bank
quarters used for the calculation of the compliance variables. Apparently some banks have been
breaching some standards in almost all bank quarters and still managed to keep their banking
license. Bank standard N11 (individuals’ deposits to capital) is on average breached most often (on
average in 1.54 quarters on a total of 23 quarters) and the breaches are on average relatively severe
(13% away from the standard). Also the capital adequacy standard is breached quite often (on
average in 0.53 quarters out of 23) and relatively severely (on average 19% away from the standard).
Next, the liquidity standards are regularly breached by commercial banks. From the summary sta-
tistics on the volume of breaches (table 2b, lower panel) the most severely breached bank standard
is the deposits to capital ratio N11, closely followed by a number of liquidity standards and the
capital adequacy standard. Still on average banks breach the standards neither terribly often nor
terribly severely. In addition, the minimal values for the compliance variables in tables 2b are
always 0: For every bank standard, one can always ﬁnd at least one bank that complies all the
time.
19Correlations between the variables are shown in table 3. There is one noteworthy source of
correlation, namely the compliance variables of liquidity standard N5 that seem to be highly cor-
related to compliance with other liquidity standards. This is not surprising given the very general
deﬁnition of this liquidity standard. Besides, one could question the usefulness of such a liquidity
standard in the Russian setting. Indeed the standard N5 only looks at very broadly deﬁned liquid
assets, but it neglects all aspects of assets/liabilities management. Having high liquid assets only
adds to bank health in the presence of corresponding highly liquid liabilities. Banks that score very
well on this standard have in fact only shown to hold few real bank assets (loans).
Insert table 2 and table 3 here.
We are not only interested in the number of bank quarters, but also in the number of banks
used in the estimations. Table 4 reveals that the more than 20000 bank quarters cover 1509 banks
of which 226 loose their license in the sample period. Most withdrawals are, according to the CBR
announcement, due to violation of bank regulation (more than 25%) or compulsory bankruptcy
(more than 53%). In practice these two reasons for withdrawal overlap in many cases. Economically
bankrupt banks tend to violate a number of bank standards. Hence our compliance and economic
variables should do well in picking up these license withdrawals in the empirical analysis. Table 4
also shows that more than 17% of the licenses disappear because of bank mergers. These mergers
could hide bank failure (mergers to avoid license withdrawal or economic failure), but could also
be genuine mergers for strategic reasons as indeed most banks are far to small to be economically
eﬃcient. To test how the treatment of mergers aﬀects our results, we will alternatively include and
exclude mergers in the sample of banks that loose their license, as a robustness check.
4A l o g i t m o d e l
We ﬁrst use a logit model to investigate the competing hypotheses aﬀecting a bank’s probability
of license withdrawal. Speciﬁcally we estimate the speciﬁcation:
Prob(license withdrawal)i,t = c + α
0
i,t−1 (economic variables)+
β
0
i,t−1 (tacit CBR objectives)+
γ
0
i,t−1 (compliance measures)+vi + εi,t.
The dependent variable is a dummy variable which equals one in the quarter when a bank loses
20it license, and zero otherwise. The independent variables are described in detail above. We control
for inﬂation, by including the deﬂator. We also include MOSCOW, a dummy variable that equals
one if the bank is registered in the Moscow region and zero otherwise, because there may be some
unidentiﬁed licensing bias for Moscow-based banks. In all speciﬁcations we allow for bank-speciﬁc
unobserved heterogeneity, since banks may diﬀer in ways that are not observed in our dataset.
The logit model is therefore estimated under the random eﬀects (RE) assumption14.R e s u l t sa r e
reported in table 5.
insert table 5 here.
Panel A of table 5 shows the estimation results using the standard compliance measures. In
columns 1-3 we show the results with mergers excluded. Column 4-6 show results with mergers
included as license withdrawals. Our ﬁrst observation is that the economic variables do reasonably
will in explaining license withdrawal. Less proﬁtable banks, banks with higher costs, banks with
poorer loan quality and banks with less liquidity are all more likely to loose their banking license.
Having high interbank liabilities however does not increase economic vulnerability as predicted by
Calomiris and Mason (2000). Instead higher interbank liabilities contribute signiﬁcantly to a lower
likelihood of license withdrawal in all speciﬁcations with the number of breaches as compliance
variable, while being insigniﬁcant in the other speciﬁcations. If anything, this suggests that the
CBR is more reluctant to withdraw licenses from banks that are active on the interbank market
and provides a ﬁrst indication that tacit objectives may be guiding the CBR in its licensing policy.
The results also suggest that the CBR’s licensing policy is guided by other concerns than
economic variables or compliance with bank standards alone. Some of the tacit CBR objectives
identiﬁed in our study do surprisingly well in explaining bank delicensing. Controlling for return to
assets, cost to assets, bank liquidity, local market power and compliance to bank standards, banks
in poorly banked regions are less likely to loose their license as shown by the strongly signiﬁcant
coeﬃcient on the regional Herﬁndahl index. Large banks are still less likely to face withdrawal,
suggesting that some banks are simply too large to be disciplined adequately. Holding an important
share of total government liabilities also helps to avoid license withdrawal. Indeed the sign on the
government portfolio share is consistently negative, although often not signiﬁcant. Note however
that holding a large amount of government securities relative to assets unambiguously increases
the likelihood of license withdrawal. This is probably still the eﬀect of the government default in
14We assume that there exists some time-invariant bank-speciﬁc factor (for example political strings or managerial
skills) which explains part of the license withdrawal probability.
21August 1998. So we ﬁnd that holding government securities is bad for a bank license, but less so
for banks that really hold a lot of these securities. Money centre banks do not enjoy additional
protection from license withdrawal beyond the protection enjoyed by all banks that are active on
the interbank market (as revealed by the negative sign for the interbank liabilities variable).
As regards the compliance measures, most of them show no signiﬁcance, suggesting regulatory
forbearance in the CBR’s delicensing policy. The variable on non-reported scores on bank standards
is very positively related to license withdrawal. Apparently a bank’s failure to report its scores on
the regulatory standards does not go down well with the CBR. Some of the liquidity standards
show up, but often with inconsistent signs, but this may be due to multicollinearity. Only the
quick liquidity ratio seems to be enforced consistently, but this is not necessarily good news. It
seems that the CBR may still be running behind the facts, mainly de-licensing totally illiquid banks
whose failure has become convenient to it owners. Important standards such as capital adequacy,
large risks to capital, or the individual deposits to capital ratio, show nothing much in the way of
enforcement. Quite on the contrary some even tend to have the wrong sign, although not signiﬁcant.
Note also that the banks standards related to insider banks (N9.1 and N10.1) show some signs of
enforcement only if mergers are included (see column 4). Apparently banks in violation with the
insider-related standards tend to merge in order to solve the problem, rather than loose their license.
The results of panel A may be biased since the CBR is implicitly assumed to attach equal
weights to present and past bank behavior. In panel B of table 5 we report speciﬁcation (1) and (2)
of panel A (mergers excluded), but now with the discounted compliance measures that attach more
weight to current violations of bank standards than to past violations. The discount parameter α
is set alternatively to 0.3, 0.5 and 0.7, increasingly putting more weight on current violations. In
the the ﬁrst three columns of panel B we run speciﬁcation (1) of panel A with three versions of
the discounted number of breaches as compliance measures. In the last three columns of panel B
we repeat speciﬁcation (2) of panel A, but now with three versions of the discounted severity of
breach as compliance measures. Results for the economic variables and the tacit CBR objectives
are equivalent with the results in panel A.
There are however substantial changes for the compliance variables. Not reporting scores still
goes down very badly as shown again by the strongly positive sign for the non-reported scores
dummy. We now however ﬁnd consistent indications for the enforcement of the capital adequacy
standard, the quick liquidity ratio, the current liquidity ratio and the general liquidity ratio. Indeed,
if these variables show up signiﬁcantly in panel B it is always with a positive sign, indicating that
22more breaches and more severe breaches of the bank standard are related to higher probability of
license withdrawal. The broad enforcement of liquidity standards is not necessarily good news. It
suggests that the CBR may still be running behind the facts, mainly de-licensing already illiquid
banks (that may be illiquid because of asset stripping in the face of expected de-licensing) instead
of anticipating future trouble. Also the insider-related standards (N9.1 and N10.1) now show
enforcement when mergers are excluded, which was not the case in panel A. Apparently current
violations of the pocket bank-related standards yield a disciplinary reaction from the CBR, while in
the past these problems were solved by mergers. All in all, the results suggests that the enforcement
of prudential bank standards by the CBR has improved.
However the large risks to capital ratio does not show strong enforcement and the individuals’
deposits to capital ratio (N11) shows no enforcement at all. On the contrary the sign for N11 is
even consistently negative. This corroborates our hypothesis that the enforcement of this standard
would aﬀect precisely these banks that are most active on the deposit market, which runs counter
to the CBR objective of securing and restoring depositor trust and systemic stability. A conﬂict
between two inconsistent CBR objectives is sharply revealed here.
5A s u r v i v a l m o d e l
As a robustness check, we employ a survival model framework to estimate the expected survival
time of a bank’s license as a function of our three groups of determinants. The dependent variable is
the survival time of a bank, t.W ed e ﬁne survival time as the time that elapses between the quarter
in which the CBR issued the bank’s license and the quarter in which the license was revoked. The
exit rate or hazard function is deﬁned as:
h(t)=
f(t)
1 − F(t)
=
f(t)
S(t)
.
We estimate:
F(t)=c + α
0
i,t−1 (economic variables)+
β
0
i,t−1 (tacit CBR objectives)+
γ
0
i,t−1 (compliance measures)+vi + εi,t,
where F(t) represents a distribution function over duration t and S(t) is the survivor function.
23For each bank, the hazard rate at time t is deﬁned as the probability of license withdrawal at
time t, conditional on having the license until time t. Once the functional form for the probability
distribution F(t) is speciﬁed, the hazard rate and the distribution of duration t are completely
known and can be made dependent on bank-speciﬁcc o v a r i a t e s . W eu s et h eA k a i k eI n f o r m a t i o n
criterion (AIC) to select the appropriate speciﬁcation for F(t). We estimate survival models for
the exponential, Weibull, Gompertz and loglogistic hazard speciﬁcation. Based on the reported
loglikelihoods for the diﬀerent speciﬁcations, we construct the AIC as −2(loglikelihood)+2(c+p+1),
where c is the number of model covariates and p the number of model-speciﬁc ancillary parameters.
The scores of the various models on the AIC criterion are reported in table 6.
We select the model which minimizes the AIC and report the estimation results for the se-
lected survival model in table 7. For the hazard estimations, the issue of unobserved heterogeneity
( f r a i l t y )i ss o m e w h a tm o r ee l a b o r a t e .S i n c ew ed on o th a v el e f tc e n s o r i n g 15, we could handle un-
observed heterogeneity on the bank-level by using the Heckman and Singer (1984) estimator16.
This estimator is non-parametric with respect to the density of unobserved heterogeneity and can
estimate the parameters of the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity and of the hazard function
consistently. We instead estimate a model where heterogeneity is allowed and incorporated as a
random eﬀects speciﬁcation. More speciﬁcally, we do assume a speciﬁc parametric representation
of the distribution of the unobserved eﬀect. In the regression results we report an extra parameter,
t h e t a ,w h i c hi sa ne s t i m a t eo ft h ef r a i l t yv a r i a n c e component. The likelihood ratio tests indicate
that there is only negligible bank-speciﬁc heterogeneity17.
Insert table 6 and 7 around here
The results in table 7 have the same structure as the results in panel B of table 5. We have
restricted ourselves to results with mergers excluded and discounted compliance variables. The
other speciﬁcations of table 5 (mergers included, volume of breach compliance measures, non-
15Although our sample is restricted to banks that were still holding a license in the ﬁrst quarter of 1999, we observe
the complete survival history for all banks and therefore do not have the problem of left-censoring in the hazard
speciﬁcations. We do have have right-censoring (we do not observe bank balances after 2002), which is taken into
account in the construction of the likelihood function.
16They assume that the unobserved heterogeneity is a bank-speciﬁc component which is assumed constant over
time and distributed over the population with a mixing distribution.
17Because we have already controlled for bank-speciﬁc characteristics, we could alternatively assume that there is
still some observational frailty present in the data in stead of bank-speciﬁc unobserved heterogeneity. After selecting
the appropriate parameterizations for this alternative speciﬁcation, we still ﬁnd only limited presence of heterogeneity.
These results are available upon request.
24discounted compliance measures) are available on request. In the ﬁrst three columns of table 7 we
use the discounted number of breaches as compliance measure, in the last three columns of table 7
we use the discounted severity of breach as compliance measure. The only diﬀerence between table
5B and table 7 is the econometric technique employed and the exact deﬁnition of the dependent
variable, which is now survival time instead of a probability of license withdrawal. Because of the
diﬀerent econometric technique we expect opposite signs in table 5 and table 7.
For the economic variables the results are very comparable to the logit model. The main diﬀer-
ence is that loan quality seems to have no impact on bank survival, while it was a good predictor
in the logit model. The ﬁnding that banks with large interbank liabilities show longer survival in
all speciﬁcations of table 7 reinforces our previous conclusion that banks that are active on the
interbank market enjoy some protection, again hinting at the presence of tacit CBR objectives. As
regards other tacit CBR objectives we ﬁnd again that banks in poorly banked regions and banks
that are too big to be disciplined adequately live longer. It is less clear now whether holding a
large share of assets in government securities is really so bad for bank survival, since this variable
is only signiﬁcant once in table 7, and the sign is not consistent across speciﬁcations.
Also for the compliance variables, the results are qualitatively the same. Banks that fail to
report their scores on bank standards live shorter. Banks in violation with the capital adequacy
standard tend to live shorter, although not always signiﬁcant. The quick liquidity ratio and the
current liquidity ratio seem to be enforced, but this is again not necessarily good news. We now
ﬁnd evidence of consistent enforcement of the bank standard on insider lending (N10.1), as we
did in table 5B. Unfortunately we also conﬁrm the earlier ﬁnding that the individuals’ deposits
to capital ratio (N11) is not properly enforced, quite on the contrary. More violations and more
severe violations tend to increase bank survival, even signiﬁcantly so for severe violations (see
speciﬁcations 2a, 2b and 2c). In sum, we can again not reject the thesis that the CBR is very
reluctant to withdraw licenses from banks that are very active on the deposit market, while there
is some level of enforcement for most other bank standards. We interpret this as support for our
thesis that the CBR suﬀers from a conﬂict between the objectives of individual bank safety and
systemic stability.
256 Summary and conclusions
In this paper we focus on the potential conﬂict between two central bank objectives, namely indi-
vidual bank stability, that is usually assured through the enforcement of prudential bank standards,
and systemic stability. We do this by empirically studying the licensing policy of the Central Bank
of Russia (CBR) in the period 1999-2002. Russia provides an interesting example to analyze po-
tential conﬂicts in the objective function of the central bank, because it has a very young central
bank that combines a lot of authorities and functions. Equally important, there are many banks
and many bank failures which allow us to study empirically how well the CBR enforces its own
bank standards. We believe however that the fundamental issue, namely the possibility of conﬂict
between individual bank stability and systemic bank stability in a central bank’s objective function,
is a fundamental one. Russia is simply the perfect country to measure it.
Our analysis found indeed indications of this conﬂict. Controlling for economic reasons of bank
failure (loan quality, proﬁtability, liquidity, eﬃciency, market power) we found that there are a
number of biases in the CBR’s licensing policy. Speciﬁcally banks in poorly banked regions, banks
that are too big to be disciplined adequately and banks that are active on the interbank market seem
to enjoy some protection against license withdrawal from the CBR, showing the CBR’s concern for
the banking system rather than individual banks. We also verify whether the CBR properly enforces
its own prudential bank standards. It turns out that there has been some level of enforcement of
the bank standards recently, but with one very important exception. The CBR turns out to be very
reluctant to withdraw bank licenses from banks that repeatedly and severely violate the individuals’
deposits to capital ratio. We interpret this as a clear indication of a conﬂict with the tacit CBR
objective of securing depositor trust and systemic stability.
These results are a mixed bag for the Russian banking sector. The fact that bank survival de-
pends strongly on economic fundamentals is positive news. The ﬁnding that most bank standards
show some level of enforcement is unexpectedly positive. However, the fact that mainly liquidity
regulations are being enforced is not really comforting. It suggests that the CBR is still running
behind the facts, mainly de-licensing already illiquid banks (that are maybe illiquid because of asset
stripping in the face of expected de-licensing) instead of anticipating future trouble. Furthermore,
we ﬁnd that tacit objectives in the CBR objective function are in conﬂict with some of the bank
standards, which creates an unwelcome inconsistency and prohibits proper enforcement. The cur-
rent economic growth has ensured that the Russian banking sector is now awash with liquidity. The
26CBR should use this window of opportunity and embark on a real restructuring and monitoring
of the banking sector. This requires a clear statement from the CBR of its objectives, transpar-
ent formulation of prudential bank standards that are consistent with the stated objectives and
enforcement of these standards by means of strong actions, ultimately closure. If not, the CBR’s
policy risks to loose credibility which will further postpone the emergence of a stable and sound
banking sector in Russia.
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30AD a t a s o u r c e s
The bank data were supplied, though not exactly for free, by two well established Russian informa-
tion agencies, INTERFAKS and MOBILE, and by the CBR. INTERFAKS supplied a database with
quarterly bank data on balances, proﬁt and loss accounts and quarter-speciﬁc, bank-speciﬁcs c o r e s
on a battery of regulatory standards for all Russian banks from 1999 to 2002. MOBILE provided
monthly bank balances and proﬁt and loss accounts and a more limited list of quarter-speciﬁc,
bank-speciﬁc scores on regulatory standards but for a longer period, from mid 1995 (although ini-
tially not for all banks) up till 2002. The two databases complement because they oﬀer diﬀerent
classiﬁcations and diﬀerent levels of detail of the same data. The ﬁnancial data employed in the
analysis includes almost 1400 banks, i.e. all operational banks in the period under study, covering
16 quarters from 1999:Q1 to 2002:Q4. These ﬁnancial data were linked to bank licensing data.
From the freely available information on the CBR’s website we reconstructed the complete register
of bank licenses. The dataset contains bank license data of all banks from 1988 up till now. For
every bank that ever existed in Russia, we know when it received a licence, what type of license it
exactly received, when it lost the license if ever and what was the oﬃcial reason for losing it. We
also know from the CBR instructions and regulations how the supervisory standards evolved in the
period under study. So for every bank in every period we know how the bank should score on a
speciﬁc standard and how it actually does, which allows the identiﬁcation of breaches of regulatory
standards. For a very detailed overview on all data issues, please consult Karas and Schoors on
www.ceriseonline.be.
B Prudential regulations of the CBR
The regulation that governs our period of study came into force on April 1, 1996 and draws on
the CBR Instruction No. 1 of January 30, 1996, ”On the Procedure for Regulating the Activities
of Credit Organisations”18. This regulation is issued in accordance with the Federal Law on the
Central Bank of the Russian Federation (Bank of Russia) and established a set of new prudential
bank standards, taking into account international banking practices. To Russian standards the new
bank standards were rather harsh and the CBR gave banks time to adjust to the new conditions.
Yet the enormous peak of license withdrawals in May 1996 (see ﬁgure 6) demonstrates that the
18For more information on regulation we refer to the references for banking legislation described at the end of the
appendix.
31adjustment process was not too gradual either. We concentrate on the bank standards or ’normas’
(as the CBR refers to them) imposed by the CBR. Next to minimal capital requirements the
CBR installed capital adequacy requirements (N1), liquidity requirements (N2, N3, N4, N5), credit
risk requirements (N7, N9, N10, N11, N12, N13), and a host of other less important (and often
non-compulsory) regulations:
B.1 Capital adequacy ratio (N1)
From April 1, 1996, the bank equity capital adequacy ratio (N1) was established as the ratio of the
bank’s equity capital to the overall risk-weighted assets minus the sum of the reserves created for
depreciation of securities and possible losses. Since February 1998, the minimum level of N1 is set
depending on the amount of the bank’s equity capital:
5m i l l i o ne u r o 1t o5m i l l i o ne u r o L e s st h a n1m i l l i o ne u r o
July, 1996 — 5%
February, 1997 — 6 %
February, 1998 — 7 % February, 1998 — 7 % February, 1998 — 7 %
February, 1999 — 8 % February, 1999 — 9 %
January, 2000 — 10 % January, 2000 — 11 %
B.2 Instant liquidity ratio (N2)
N2 is deﬁned as the ratio of the sum of the bank’s highly liquid assets to the sum of the bank’s
liabilities on demand accounts. The minimum value of the N2 ratio was set at 10% since July 1,
1996 and 20% since February 1, 1997.
B.3 Current liquidity ratio (N3)
The current liquidity ratio (N3) was established as the ratio of the sum of the bank’s liquid assets
to the sum of the bank’s liabilities on demand accounts and accounts up to 30 days. The minimum
value of the current liquidity ratio was set at no less than:
20% of total assets as of July 1, 1996;
30% of total assets as of February 1, 1997;
50% of total assets as of February 1, 1998;
70% of the balance as of February 1, 1999.
32B.4 Long-term liquidity ratio (N4)
The long-term liquidity ratio (N4) is established as the ratio of the entire long-term debt to the
bank, including guarantees and sureties with a maturity of more than one year, to the bank’s equity
capital and liabilities on deposit accounts, credits received and other debt liabilities with maturities
exceeding one year. The long-term liquidity ratio should not exceed 120%.
B.5 General liquidity ratio (N5)
The general liquidity ratio is deﬁned as the percentage of liquid assets in the bank’s aggregate
assets. The minimum value of the N5 ratio has been set at:
10% of total assets as of July 1, 1996;
20% of total assets as of February 1, 1997.
B.6 Maximum large credit risk (N7)
The maximum large credit risk (N7) is established as a percentage of the total amount of large
credit risks in the bank’s equity capital. A large credit is the total sum of the bank’s risk-weighted
claims to one borrower (or a group of related borrowers) on credits, taking into account 50% of the
sum of oﬀ-balance claims - guarantees and sureties held by the bank with regard to one borrower
(or a group of related borrowers), exceeding 5% of the bank’s equity capital. Note that the decision
to extend such a large credit or loan must be made by the board of the bank or its credit committee,
taking into account the opinion of the bank’s credit department. Maximum large credit risk should
not exceed the bank’s capital by more than 12 times in 1996, 10 times in 1997 and 8 times in 1998.
B.7 Maximum risk per borrower-shareholder (N9.1)
The maximum risk per borrower-shareholder (partner) (N9.1) is established as the amount of
credits, guarantees and sureties issued by the bank to one corporate or individual shareholder
(partner) or to a group of related corporate or individual shareholders of the bank divided by
equity capital. Related shareholders are corporate and individual shareholders connected with
one another economically and legally (i.e., having common property and/or mutual guarantees
and/or obligations, and/or controlling each other’s property and also an individual concurrently
holding several senior executive positions) in such a way that the ﬁnancial problems of one of the
33shareholders cause or may cause ﬁnancial problems for another shareholder(s). N9.1 should not
exceed 50% of the bank’s equity capital from January 1, 1998.
B.8 Maximum credit to insiders (N10.1)
The aggregate amount of credits and loans extended to insiders (N10.1) may not exceed 3% of
the bank’s equity capital. Insiders comprise the following individuals: shareholders who own more
than 5% of shares, directors (presidents, chairmen and their deputies), Board members, members
of the credit committee, senior executives of subsidiary and parent structures and other persons
who may inﬂuence the decision to issue credit, and also relatives of insiders, former insiders and
other persons participating in outside structures, in which insiders participate as well.
B.9 Minimal coverage of household deposits by capital (N11)
N11 is established as the ratio of the sum of household deposits to equity capital. Since July 1996,
household deposits should be 100% covered by equity capital.
B.10 Minimal coverage of the bank’s investments in shares by capital (N12)
The bank’s own investments in shares of other legal entities has been limited to:
45% of equity capital as of July 1, 1996;
35% of equity capital as of October 1, 1996;
25% of equity capital as of January 1, 1997.
B.11 Bank’s own promissory note liability risk ratio (N13)
N13 is established as the percentage of the bills of exchange and bills of acceptance issued by the
bank plus 50% of the bank’s oﬀ-balance liabilities arising from the endorsement of bills, sureties
and bill brokerage in the bank’s equity capital. The maximum levels have been set at:
200% of the balance as of October 1, 1996;
100% of the balance as of March 1, 1997.
B.12 References for banking legislation
Federal Law of December 2, 1990, No. 395-1, “On Banks and Banking Activity”.
34Instruction No.1 of May 5, 1991, “On the Procedure of Regulating the Activities of Credit Organ-
isations”.
Bank of Russia Instruction No.1 of January 30, 1996, “On the Procedure of Regulating the Activities
of Credit Organisations” of May 5,1991.
C i v i lC o d eo fR u s s i a nF e d e r a t i o n ,p a r tI .
Bank of Russia Instruction No.59 of March 31, 1997, “On Imposing Sanctions to Credit Organiza-
tions for Infringement of Prudential Norms”.
Bank of Russia Letter No.121-T of August 20, 2003 “About actions which should be taken when
facts of breaching norms N8, N9, N11, N11.1 and N14 are revealed”.
Bank of Russia Letter No.124-T of August 21, 2003 “On the bank’s own promissory note liability
risk ratio N13”.
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Figure 2: Bank branches per capita (2002). Source: own calculations based on data from the CBR
(bank branches per region) and Goskomstat (population expressed in thousands).
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0 marks the ﬁrst quarter in which we observe bank-speciﬁcs c o r e so nd i ﬀerent regula-
tions; tT marks the end of our sample (2002.4); ti
iss marks the quarter in which bank i’s license was
issued; ti
0 marks the ﬁrst observation of bank i; tT − tPR
0 marks the sample period for observing
bank standards; t − k is the number of potential breaches; t − tPR
0 is the number of quarters used
to correct for ’late entry’ or ’late license issuance’.
39TABLE 1
Description of Variables and Data Sources
De°ator
1 Average monthly in°ation (%).
Moscow Dummy A dummy variable which equals one if the bank is located
in Moscow, zero otherwise.
Economic Variables
Return on assets
2 The returns-to-assets ratio of bank i in quarter t (%).
Cost/assets
2 The ratio of personnel costs to two month average of total assets
of bank i in quarter t (%).
Interbank liabilities/liabilities
2 Interbank liabilities to total liabilities of bank i in quarter t (%).
Regional market share (assets)
2 The regional
4 market share in assets, calculated as the
ratio of bank i's individual assets to the sum of bank
assets for region j in quarter t (between 0 and 100).
Non performing loans/loans
2 The ratio of non-performing loans to total loans of bank i in quarter t (%).
Reserves/assets
2 The ratio of total reserves (including excess reserves)
to total assets of bank i in quarter t (%).
Tacit CBR Objectives
Regional Her¯ndahl (assets)
2 The regional
4 Her¯ndahl index, calculated as the sum of squared
regional market shares for each region j in quarter t
(between 0 and 1000).
Size (log assets)
2 The log of assets of bank i in quarter t.
Interbank market share - The share of interbank liabilities of bank i's individual interbank
(money centre banks)
2 liabilities to the country total in quarter t (%).
Government claims/assets
2 The ratio of government claims to assets of bank i in quarter t (%).
Government portfolio share
2 The share of bank i's individual government claims to the country total
in quarter t (%).
Compliance with Regulatory Standards
3
Non-reported scores A dummy variable which equals one when information on regulatory
standards 7, 9.1, 10.1, 11, 12 and 13 is not reported and zero otherwise.
breachn;i;t A dummy variable which equals one whenever bank i violates
regulation n in quarter t, zero otherwise.
nbreachn;i;t The sum of actual breaches -relative to the maximum potential-
registered by bank i from t
PR
0 up till t, corrected for 'late entry'
(see Figure 5).
dnbreachn;i;t An exponentially smoothed version of nbreach with varying weights for ®.
sbreachn;i;t The average severity of breaches registered by bank i from
t
PR
0 up till t. Severity is de¯ned as the relative deviation from the
prudential standard whenever breach equals one.
dsbreachn;i;t An exponentially smoothed version of sbreach with varying weights for ®.
vbreachn;i;t The product of nbreach and sbreach of bank i in quarter t.
1 Source: Russian Economic Trends. 2 Source: Own calculations based on Interfaks. 3 Source: Own calculations based on
regulatory standards published by the CBR (see Appendix B) and bank-speci¯c scores on regulatory standards acquired
from Interfaks and Mobile. 4 Note: We use 80 regions for the calculation of regional market shares.TABLE 2a
Summary Statistics: Economic Variables
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
De°ator 20840 1.97 1.75 0.46 8.02
Moscow Dummy 20840 0.48 0.50 0 1
Economic Variables
Return on assets 20730 0.58 8.18 -149.61 479.61
Cost/assets 20807 1.30 2.16 0 76.60
Interbank liabilities/liabilities 20801 10.66 19.19 0 100
Regional market share (assets) 20840 5.75 13.97 0 100
Non performing loans/loans 20387 5.06 12.96 0 100
Reserves/assets 20840 17.63 15.49 0 100
Tacit CBR Objectives
Regional Her¯ndahl (assets) 20840 1746 1302 399 8955
Size (log assets) 20840 4.92 1.95 -1.94 11.75
Interbank market share 20840 0.08 0.54 0 16.78
(money centre banks)
Government claims/assets 20840 1.91 6.50 0 100
Government portfolio share 20840 0.08 0.85 0 35.65
Source: Own calculations based on Interfaks, Russian Economic Trends and CBR. Detailed information on
variable de¯nitions is provided in Table 1.TABLE 2b
Summary Statistics: Compliance with Regulatory Standards
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Non-reported scores 20840 0.07 0.25 0 1
Number of Breaches
Capital adequacy ratio (N1) 20503 0.53 1.66 0 21
Quick liquidity ratio (N2) 20493 0.74 1.89 0 16
Current liquidity ratio (N3) 20494 1.06 2.14 0 17
Long-term liquidity ratio (N4) 20492 0.13 0.66 0 11
General liquidity ratio (N5) 20500 1.10 2.48 0 20
Large-risks-to-capital ratio (N7) 20493 0.07 0.41 0 6
Owner-related-credit-risks-to-capital ratio (N9.1) 20491 0.19 0.64 0 6
Insider-related-credit-risks-to-capital ratio (N10.1) 20492 0.16 0.63 0 9
Individuals' deposits-to-capital ratio (N11) 20491 1.54 3.37 0 22
Investment-to-shares-to-capital ratio (N12) 20491 0.16 0.60 0 8
Issued-promissory-notes-to-capital ratio (N13) 20492 0.35 1.18 0 16
Severity of Breach
Capital adequacy ratio (N1) 20488 0.19 2.03 0 59.12
Quick liquidity ratio (N2) 20473 0.15 0.79 0 13.98
Current liquidity ratio (N3) 20491 0.14 0.95 0 26.38
Long-term liquidity ratio (N4) 20433 0.01 0.09 0 1.82
General liquidity ratio (N5) 20481 0.05 0.16 0 2.70
Large-risks-to-capital ratio (N7) 20401 0.00 0.02 0 0.50
Owner-related-credit-risks-to-capital ratio (N9.1) 20440 0.03 0.18 0 4.18
Insider-related-credit-risks-to-capital ratio (N10.1) 20407 0.05 0.41 0 16.44
Individuals' deposits-to-capital ratio (N11) 20462 0.13 0.55 0 8.67
Investment-to-shares-to-capital ratio (N12) 20473 0.03 0.20 0 4.35
Issued-promissory-notes-to-capital ratio (N13) 20452 0.05 0.29 0 5.66
Volume of Breach
Capital adequacy ratio (N1) 20387 0.35 3.20 0 99.40
Quick liquidity ratio (N2) 20441 0.75 4.76 0 81.52
Current liquidity ratio (N3) 20477 0.83 5.79 0 99.99
Long-term liquidity ratio (N4) 20424 0.03 0.26 0 5.11
General liquidity ratio (N5) 20442 0.34 1.36 0 15.33
Large-risks-to-capital ratio (N7) 20401 0.00 0.04 0 0.65
Owner-related-credit-risks-to-capital ratio (N9.1) 20435 0.06 0.43 0 9.13
Insider-related-credit-risks-to-capital ratio (N10.1) 20407 0.13 1.29 0 40.95
Individuals' deposits-to-capital ratio (N11) 20420 0.85 3.49 0 50.58
Investment-to-shares-to-capital ratio (N12) 20462 0.07 0.56 0 11.85
Issued-promissory-notes-to-capital ratio (N13) 20426 0.16 1.18 0 26.97
Source: Own calculations based on Interfaks, Mobile and CBR. Note: The calculations of the compliance
variables are based on the period 1997:Q2 - 2002:Q4. The estimation sample is restricted to the period
1999:Q1 - 2002:Q4. More detailed information on variable construction is provided in Table 1. Detailed
information on regulatory standards is provided in appendix.T
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.TABLE 4
Descriptive statistics
In Sample of Estimation
Analysis time 1999:Q1 - 2002:Q4
No. of banks 1509
No. of failures 226
Reason of Failure Percent Cum.
Violation of bank legislation 25.23 25.23
Compulsory Bankruptcy 53.47 78.7
Voluntary bankruptcy
Voluntary liquidation 3.66 82.36
Merger 17.64 100
Source: Own calculations based on CBR. Note: The calculations of the com-
pliance variables are based on the period 1997:Q2 - 2002:Q4. The estimation
sample is restricted to the period 1999:Q1 - 2002:Q4. More detailed informa-
tion on variable construction is provided in Table 1. Detailed information on
regulatory standards is provided in appendix.TABLE 5A
Regression Results for the Logit Model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
nbreach sbreach vbreach nbreach sbreach vbreach
Merger Excluded Merger Included
Constant -4.0066*** -3.1001*** -3.3791*** -7.4230*** -3.2379*** -3.4072***
[0.7937] [0.5546] [0.5762] [1.0699] [0.4875] [0.5171]
De°ator -0.0588 -0.0273 -0.0237 -0.3853*** 0.01 0.0068
[0.0700] [0.0508] [0.0522] [0.1187] [0.0453] [0.0474]
Moscow Dummy 0.2892 0.1633 0.3086 -0.3431 -0.086 -0.0008
[0.4317] [0.3208] [0.3331] [0.5495] [0.2714] [0.2850]
Economic Variables
Return on assets -0.0159** -0.0171*** -0.0181*** -0.0051 -0.0099* -0.0103*
[0.0065] [0.0060] [0.0061] [0.0040] [0.0059] [0.0060]
Cost/assets 0.1439*** 0.1206*** 0.1300*** 0.2230*** 0.1026*** 0.1099***
[0.0338] [0.0240] [0.0254] [0.0529] [0.0227] [0.0242]
Interbank liabilities/liabilities -0.0131** -0.0053 -0.0052 -0.0129* 0.0006 0.0016
[0.0060] [0.0049] [0.0050] [0.0076] [0.0043] [0.0044]
Regional market share(assets) -0.0083 -0.0039 0.0114 0.0142 0.0071 0.0166
[0.0194] [0.0174] [0.0175] [0.0372] [0.0124] [0.0125]
Non performing loans/loans 0.0308*** 0.0233*** 0.0279*** 0.0533*** 0.0216*** 0.0265***
[0.0059] [0.0046] [0.0050] [0.0083] [0.0044] [0.0049]
Reserves/assets -0.1253*** -0.1263*** -0.1306*** -0.0669*** -0.0778*** -0.0800***
[0.0190] [0.0178] [0.0184] [0.0146] [0.0120] [0.0124]
Tacit CBR Objectives
Regional Her¯ndahl (assets) -0.0009*** -0.0008*** -0.0008*** -0.0015*** -0.0006*** -0.0007***
[0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0003] [0.0002] [0.0002]
Size (log assets) -0.2068*** -0.1329** -0.1318** -0.1523 -0.1493*** -0.1613***
[0.0783] [0.0614] [0.0641] [0.0992] [0.0569] [0.0598]
Interbank market share 0.2703 0.117 0.0489 -0.0443 0.0831 0.0278
(money centre banks) [0.2099] [0.1679] [0.2108] [0.3890] [0.1786] [0.2126]
Government claims/assets 0.0231 0.0344*** 0.0270* 0.0318 0.0317*** 0.0264**
[0.0159] [0.0132] [0.0140] [0.0205] [0.0119] [0.0127]
Government portfolio share -0.3357 -0.1351 -0.1307 -1.5549* -0.2063 -0.2078
[0.4349] [0.2721] [0.2584] [0.9145] [0.3294] [0.3333]
(Continued)TABLE 5A
CONTINUED
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
nbreach sbreach vbreach nbreach sbreach vbreach
Merger Excluded Merger Included
Compliance with Regulatory Standards
Non-reported scores 1.7734*** 1.5782*** 1.6133*** 1.5015*** 1.3474*** 1.3596***
[0.2219] [0.2077] [0.2104] [0.2506] [0.1976] [0.2004]
Capital adequacy ratio (N1) -0.0253 -0.0824 0.0219 0.0394 -0.0878* 0.018
[0.0688] [0.0506] [0.0164] [0.0964] [0.0485] [0.0165]
Quick liquidity ratio (N2) 0.4368*** 0.3406*** 0.1173*** 0.9817*** 0.3270*** 0.1098***
[0.1137] [0.0755] [0.0207] [0.1910] [0.0741] [0.0212]
Current liquidity ratio (N3) 0.2160** -0.5292** -0.1137*** 0.4314*** -0.5307** -0.1101***
[0.1030] [0.2121] [0.0362] [0.1384] [0.2069] [0.0348]
Long-term liquidity ratio (N4) -0.4393* 0.7402 0.1457 -0.8064** 0.8383 0.0741
[0.2297] [0.5946] [0.2991] [0.3297] [0.5734] [0.2910]
General liquidity ratio (N5) -0.2391*** 2.0223*** 0.1420* -0.5500*** 1.8343*** 0.1232*
[0.0886] [0.5491] [0.0744] [0.1506] [0.5287] [0.0704]
Large-risks- 0.0605 2.2841 2.5463 0.1014 2.1966 2.4205
to-capital ratio (N7) [0.3349] [2.3742] [1.9380] [0.3757] [2.3479] [1.8426]
Owner-related-credit-risks- 0.2722 0.0796 0.1778 0.6665*** -0.0498 0.1088
to-capital ratio (N9.1) [0.1794] [0.4097] [0.1963] [0.2194] [0.3717] [0.1833]
Insider-related-credit-risks- 0.193 -0.0577 0.0023 0.4861** -0.1303 -0.0122
to-capital ratio (N10.1) [0.1894] [0.2778] [0.0736] [0.2362] [0.2873] [0.0782]
Individuals' deposits- -0.0106 -0.2558 -0.0231 -0.0227 -0.1877 -0.0046
to-capital ratio (N11) [0.0561] [0.2028] [0.0358] [0.0601] [0.1806] [0.0276]
Investment-to-shares- 0.3902** 0.3268 0.1757 0.7198*** 0.1757 0.113
to-capital ratio (N12) [0.1580] [0.3409] [0.1278] [0.2403] [0.3536] [0.1281]
Issued-promissory-notes- 0.0052 0.2787 -0.0109 -0.0031 0.2943 0.0719
to-capital ratio (N13) [0.1235] [0.2424] [0.0883] [0.1045] [0.2229] [0.0518]
Observations 19728 19381 19168 20048 19694 19475
Number of banks 1393 1376 1364 1432 1413 1401
Log Likelihood -635.91 -602.89 -601.29 -819.86 -779.52 -776.8
Wald chi2 220.48 296.42 268.87 175.09 299.17 269.72
Note: The breach variables in the regression equations are: (1) and (4) the number of breaches (nbreach), (2) and (5)
the severity of breaches (sbreach) and (3) and (6) the volume of breaches (vbreach). The dependent variable is a dummy
variable, license withdrawal, which equals one in the quarter when a bank's license was revoked and zero otherwise. Moscow
is a dummy variable which equals one if the bank is located in Moscow and zero otherwise. The Her¯ndahl index is an
average over time. All other variables are time-varying. Table 1 provides a more detailed description of all variables. The
logit estimations are performed under the RE assumption. Robust standard errors are given in brackets. *, ** and ***
indicate signi¯cance levels of 10, 5 and 1 percent respectively.TABLE 5B
Regression Results for the Logit Model - Discounted Breach Variables (Merger Excluded)
dnbreach dsbreach
(1a) (1b) (1c) (2a) (2b) (2c)
® = :3 ® = :5 ® = :7 ® = :3 ® = :5 ® = :7
Constant -4.6578*** -4.3521*** -4.0474*** -3.4314*** -3.3687*** -3.1164***
[0.9064] [0.7788] [0.7159] [0.5268] [0.6102] [0.5360]
De°ator -0.0636 -0.0353 -0.0115 -0.0536 -0.1107* -0.0679
[0.0750] [0.0654] [0.0606] [0.0501] [0.0618] [0.0507]
Moscow Dummy 0.3821 0.3412 0.285 0.5047 0.452 0.425
[0.4946] [0.4422] [0.4065] [0.3204] [0.3509] [0.3279]
Economic Variables
Return on assets -0.0103* -0.0093* -0.0083* -0.0161*** -0.0115* -0.0107*
[0.0055] [0.0049] [0.0047] [0.0058] [0.0061] [0.0056]
Cost/assets 0.1602*** 0.1390*** 0.1247*** 0.1175*** 0.1207*** 0.1084***
[0.0391] [0.0342] [0.0319] [0.0230] [0.0267] [0.0243]
Interbank liabilities/liabilities -0.0171** -0.0155** -0.0141** -0.0032 -0.0043 -0.0058
[0.0068] [0.0064] [0.0060] [0.0047] [0.0050] [0.0046]
Regional market share(assets) -0.0035 -0.0002 0.0032 0.0049 0.0027 0.0066
[0.0223] [0.0197] [0.0183] [0.0150] [0.0153] [0.0139]
Non performing loans/loans 0.0223*** 0.0178*** 0.0157*** 0.0147*** 0.0165*** 0.0126***
[0.0060] [0.0055] [0.0052] [0.0040] [0.0050] [0.0042]
Reserves/assets -0.1093*** -0.0972*** -0.0906*** -0.1063*** -0.1076*** -0.1103***
[0.0198] [0.0187] [0.0177] [0.0172] [0.0178] [0.0177]
Tacit CBR Objectives
Regional Her¯ndahl (assets) -0.0011*** -0.0010*** -0.0009*** -0.0006*** -0.0006*** -0.0006***
[0.0003] [0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0002]
Size (log assets) -0.2573*** -0.2796*** -0.2912*** -0.1659*** -0.2116*** -0.2136***
[0.0886] [0.0833] [0.0787] [0.0591] [0.0667] [0.0598]
Interbank market share 0.2456 0.1417 0.1018 0.1429 0.1774 0.1104
(money centre banks) [0.3069] [0.3520] [0.3404] [0.1518] [0.1708] [0.1892]
Government claims/assets 0.0178 0.0146 0.0121 0.0359*** 0.0352*** 0.0336***
[0.0173] [0.0163] [0.0151] [0.0125] [0.0137] [0.0122]
Government portfolio share -0.6673 -0.5481 -0.445 -0.1332 -0.1438 -0.0926
[0.7189] [0.6301] [0.5674] [0.2929] [0.3111] [0.2415]
(Continued)TABLE 5B
CONTINUED
dnbreach dsbreach
(1a) (1b) (1c) (2a) (2b) (2c)
® = :3 ® = :5 ® = :7 ® = :3 ® = :5 ® = :7
Compliance with Regulatory Standards
Non-reported scores 1.8602*** 1.7681*** 1.7048*** 1.5326*** 1.5002*** 1.4089***
[0.2440] [0.2372] [0.2308] [0.2130] [0.2247] [0.2188]
Capital adequacy ratio (N1) 0.0405 0.0926** 0.1151*** -0.0477 -0.0143 0.1852*
[0.0570] [0.0434] [0.0365] [0.0689] [0.0688] [0.0978]
Quick liquidity ratio (N2) 0.3829*** 0.2850*** 0.2272*** 0.2064*** 0.1426** 0.0056
[0.0730] [0.0477] [0.0370] [0.0658] [0.0673] [0.0708]
Current liquidity ratio (N3) 0.1863** 0.1208** 0.0889** -0.5346 0.5276 1.5077***
[0.0734] [0.0516] [0.0413] [0.3405] [0.4386] [0.5664]
Long-term liquidity ratio (N4) -0.1946 -0.0832 -0.0444 0.5298 0.8268 2.5782***
[0.1534] [0.0979] [0.0753] [0.8485] [0.9808] [0.9392]
General liquidity ratio (N5) -0.0251 0.0263 0.0416 2.6931*** 1.7517*** 0.67
[0.0744] [0.0517] [0.0404] [0.4980] [0.5036] [0.5093]
Large-risks- 0.2082 0.1406 0.0909 -0.292 4.6287 5.4788*
to-capital ratio (N7) [0.1325] [0.0869] [0.0652] [2.5027] [3.1311] [3.0403]
Owner-related-credit-risks- 0.3313* 0.1867 0.1311 1.1493*** 0.7023 0.9933*
to-capital ratio (N9.1) [0.1790] [0.1302] [0.1032] [0.4413] [0.5689] [0.5271]
Insider-related-credit-risks- 0.3147*** 0.1928** 0.1167 0.0009 0.0787 0.4321**
to-capital ratio (N10.1) [0.1179] [0.0945] [0.0826] [0.0880] [0.1644] [0.2167]
Individuals' deposits- -0.0542 -0.0578 -0.0551 -0.2562 -0.2294 -0.3398
to-capital ratio (N11) [0.0627] [0.0546] [0.0479] [0.2312] [0.2669] [0.2641]
Investment-to-shares- 0.2175 0.1043 0.0514 0.0387 -0.6422 0.015
to-capital ratio (N12) [0.1432] [0.1138] [0.0893] [0.7810] [1.4594] [1.1001]
Issued-promissory-notes- 0.0203 0.0353 0.0357 -0.0199 -0.3255 -0.405
to-capital ratio (N13) [0.0999] [0.0711] [0.0571] [0.3569] [0.5980] [0.4963]
Observations 19481 19728 19728 19445 19484 19507
Number of banks 1393 1393 1393 1382 1382 1385
Log Likelihood -572.84 -553.12 -545.77 -560.38 -546.38 -547.22
Wald chi2 166.27 193.34 212.38 413.15 243.15 435.23
Note: The breach variables in the regression equation are: (1) discounted number of breaches assuming exponential smooth-
ing: (1a) dnbreach (®=0.3), (1b) dnbreach (®=0.5), (1c) dnbreach (®=0.7), (2) discounted severity of breaches assuming
exponential smoothing: (2a) dsbreach (®=0.3), (2b) dsbreach (®=0.5), (2c) dsbreach (®=0.7). The dependent variable is a
dummy variable, license withdrawal, which equals one in the quarter when a bank's license was revoked and zero otherwise.
Moscow is a dummy variable which equals one if the bank is located in Moscow and zero otherwise. The Her¯ndahl index
is an average over time. All other variables are time-varying. Table 1 provides a more detailed description of all variables.
The logit estimations are performed under the RE assumption. Robust standard errors are given in brackets. *, ** and ***
indicate signi¯cance levels of 10, 5 and 1 percent respectively.TABLE 6
Model Selection for the Survival Model: Akaike Information Criterion
Exponential Weibull Gompertz Loglogistic
(1a) ® = :3 182.39 181.09 182.38 146.43
dnbreach (1b) ® = :5 144.48 144.91 145.86 119.01
(1c) ® = :7 127.66 128.69 129.42 108.80
(2a) ® = :3 302.75 299.15 300.01 197.85
dsbreach (2b) ® = :5 291.26 288.56 289.30 163.61
(2c) ® = :7 270.24 268.13 268.87 127.38
Note: The breach variables in the regression equation are: (1) discounted number
of breaches assuming exponential smoothing: (1a) dnbreach (®=0.3), (1b) dnbreach
(®=0.5), (1c) dnbreach (®=0.7), (2) discounted severity of breaches assuming exponen-
tial smoothing: (2a) dsbreach (®=0.3), (2b) dsbreach (®=0.5), (2c) dsbreach (®=0.7).
We choose the parameterization which minimizes the AIC (bold).TABLE 7
Regression Results for the Survival Model - Discounted Breach Variables (Merger Excluded)
dnbreach dsbreach
(1a) (1b) (1c) (2a) (2b) (2c)
® = :3 ® = :5 ® = :7 ® = :3 ® = :5 ® = :7
Constant 3.8072*** 3.7392*** 3.7302*** 4.1602*** 3.9582*** 3.9480***
[0.2094] [0.1938] [0.1893] [0.2922] [0.2725] [0.2827]
De°ator -0.0283 -0.0277 -0.0303* 0.0211 0.0251 0.0389
[0.0185] [0.0170] [0.0161] [0.0307] [0.0302] [0.0299]
Moscow Dummy -0.1996 -0.1653 -0.1773 -0.4914** -0.4179** -0.4744**
Economic Variables [0.1311] [0.1233] [0.1188] [0.1951] [0.1773] [0.1863]
Return on assets 0.0035** 0.002 0.0015 0.0014 0.0018 0.0007
[0.0017] [0.0017] [0.0016] [0.0025] [0.0070] [0.0025]
Cost/assets -0.0260** -0.0238** -0.0216** -0.0510** -0.0452** -0.0412***
[0.0112] [0.0100] [0.0096] [0.0198] [0.0184] [0.0144]
Interbank liabilities/liabilities 0.0058** 0.0052** 0.0046** 0.0053 0.0053* 0.0054*
[0.0025] [0.0023] [0.0022] [0.0032] [0.0030] [0.0029]
Regional market share (assets) -0.0041 -0.0021 -0.0015 0.0109 0.0027 0.002
[0.0064] [0.0068] [0.0062] [0.0133] [0.0110] [0.0100]
Non performing loans/loans -0.0029 -0.0026 -0.0023 -0.0043 -0.002 -0.0027
[0.0024] [0.0021] [0.0020] [0.0033] [0.0030] [0.0029]
Reserves/assets 0.0338*** 0.0298*** 0.0266*** 0.0318*** 0.0313*** 0.0313***
Tacit CBR Objectives [0.0067] [0.0063] [0.0059] [0.0078] [0.0082] [0.0074]
Regional Her¯ndahl (assets) 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
[0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001]
Size (log assets) 0.0653*** 0.0700*** 0.0780*** 0.0825** 0.0871*** 0.0883***
[0.0232] [0.0222] [0.0219] [0.0323] [0.0314] [0.0284]
Interbank market share -0.0225 -0.016 -0.013 -0.0506 -0.037 -0.0025
(money centre banks) [0.1094] [0.1276] [0.1290] [0.1099] [0.1270] [0.1770]
Government claims/assets -0.006 -0.0013 0.0009 -0.0133 -0.0158* -0.0131
[0.0093] [0.0079] [0.0059] [0.0107] [0.0093] [0.0108]
Government portfolio share 0.1537 0.2388 0.2166 0.8542 0.6535 0.7296
[0.1929] [0.3193] [0.2915] [0.6338] [1.5134] [0.6081]
(Continued)TABLE 7
CONTINUED
dnbreach dsbreach
(1a) (1b) (1c) (2a) (2b) (2c)
® = :3 ® = :5 ® = :7 ® = :3 ® = :5 ® = :7
Compliance with Regulatory Standards
Non-reported scores -0.6639*** -0.6443*** -0.6254*** -0.7727*** -0.7678*** -0.7460***
[0.1023] [0.0919] [0.0889] [0.1342] [0.1158] [0.1122]
Capital adequacy ratio (N1) -0.0297 -0.0267 -0.0284* 0.2259 -0.0784 -0.3751
[0.0272] [0.0202] [0.0170] [0.1740] [0.1330] [0.3024]
Quick liquidity ratio (N2) -0.1463*** -0.1005*** -0.0790*** -1.5551** -1.3822*** -1.2931***
[0.0285] [0.0200] [0.0155] [0.6215] [0.3681] [0.3240]
Current liquidity ratio (N3) -0.0629** -0.0502*** -0.0421*** -4.0266*** -1.9672*** -1.2172***
[0.0248] [0.0179] [0.0145] [1.1415] [0.6934] [0.4609]
Long-term liquidity ratio (N4) 0.1499** 0.1044** 0.0737** 2.7154 2.7784** 1.8269*
[0.0615] [0.0422] [0.0376] [2.1230] [1.2303] [0.9578]
General liquidity ratio (N5) 0.0133 0.0011 -0.0062 0.7897 0.2532 -0.0164
[0.0227] [0.0165] [0.0138] [0.6787] [0.4786] [0.3608]
Large-risks- -0.0157 -0.0104 -0.0034 -0.9381 -2.8056 -4.2494**
to-capital ratio (N7) [0.0424] [0.0313] [0.0270] [2.3161] [1.8444] [1.8832]
Owner-related-credit-risks- -0.0523 -0.0398 -0.04 0.4501 0.2899 0.0642
to-capital ratio (N9.1) [0.0556] [0.0415] [0.0375] [0.3709] [0.4224] [0.3412]
Insider-related-credit-risks- -0.0921*** -0.0655*** -0.0548*** -0.0012 -0.3293*** -0.3046***
to-capital ratio (N10.1) [0.0296] [0.0233] [0.0203] [0.0230] [0.1035] [0.0916]
Individuals' deposits- 0.0305 0.0231 0.019 0.3554* 0.2845* 0.3701**
to-capital ratio (N11) [0.0186] [0.0151] [0.0137] [0.2013] [0.1557] [0.1739]
Investment-to-shares- -0.0941* -0.0538 -0.0392 -0.5241 -0.0729 -6.7723***
to-capital ratio (N12) [0.0565] [0.0562] [0.0629] [0.4581] [0.6801] [1.8875]
Issued-promissory-notes- 0.0074 -0.0089 -0.0124 0.3182 0.3193 0.0271
to-capital ratio (N13) [0.0272] [0.0190] [0.0158] [0.2411] [0.3699] [0.2705]
Observations 19481 19728 19728 19445 19484 19507
Number of banks 1393 1393 1393 1382 1382 1385
Log Likelihood -45.22 -31.5 -26.4 -70.92 -53.8 -35.69
Wald chi2 642.84 673.97 684.18 531.66 557.49 602.4
No. of failures 160 160 160 135 133 137
theta 0.09 1.16E-09 7.77E-10 0.40 1.32E-10 1.46E-10
LR test heterogeneity 0.22 0.00 0.00 1.63 0.00 0.00
Prob 0.32 1 1 0.10 1 1
Note: The breach variables in the regression equation are: (1) discounted number of breaches assuming exponential smooth-
ing: (1a) dnbreach (®=0.3), (1b) dnbreach (®=0.5), (1c) dnbreach (®=0.7), (2) discounted severity of breaches assuming
exponential smoothing: (2a) dsbreach (®=0.3), (2b) dsbreach (®=0.5), (2c) dsbreach (®=0.7). The dependent variable is
the number of quarters between the issuance and revokal of a bank's license. Table 1 provides a detailed description of
all explanatory variables. The functional form for the hazard ratio was chosen based on the Akaike information criterion
of model selection. Detailed results for model selection are included in Table 6. All survival model estimations allow for
bank-speci¯c unobserved heterogeneity which is assumed to be inverse Gaussian distributed. Theta is an estimate of the
variance of heterogeneity. The LR test for heterogeneity is a likelihood ratio test of the null hypothesis that this variance
is zero. *, ** and *** indicate signi¯cance levels of 10, 5 and 1 percent respectively. 
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